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The California Constitution proclaims, "[a]ll political power is in-
herent in the people,"1 and further provides that "[t]he initiative is the
power of the electors to propose ... amendments to the Constitu-
tion."' In addition to these provisions empowering the voters to make
law, the constitution declares that the "[r]ights guaranteed by this
Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution."3 This section embodies the doctrine of in-
dependent state grounds and means that federal interpretation of fed-
eral rights should not limit the interpretation of similar rights
expressed in California's Declaration of Rights. The doctrine pro-
vides the basis for protecting rights in California not protected under
the Federal Constitution. While this Article focuses on rights which
affect those accused of crimes, California courts have relied on the
doctrine of independent state grounds to expand the rights of Califor-
nians in other areas as well. For example, Californians have invoked
their inalienable right to privacy4 to protect employment records,
health records, financial records, scholastic records, and sexual his-
tory.5 The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, gives
little protection to such information under the Federal Constitution.6
Through the independent state grounds doctrine, the California Con-
stitution also affords Californians greater protection of their right to
freedom of expression than does the analogous federal right.7
The voters of California, however, have recently used the initia-
tive to force the interpretation of California constitutional rights to
depend upon interpretations of similar rights under the United States
Constitution. This is undesirable because, although the United States
and California Constitutions use similar language, to preserve the in-
tegrity of California's constitution, California courts should not be
forced to follow federal precedents.8 Without such independence Cal-
ifornia's Constitution and its declaration of rights become meaningless
1. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
2. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
3. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 24.
4. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
5. Margaret C. Crosby, New Frontiers: Individual Rights Under the California Consti-
tution, 17 HAstmns CONST. L.Q. 81, 95-96 n.87-91 (1989).
6. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (health records).
7. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), affd, 447 U.S. 74
(1980).
8. Of course, pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
rights of Californians may not fall below what has been called the "federal floor." At a
minimum, states are bound by the Due Process Clause, but states can grant greater rights.
See, e.g., Harry C. Martin, The State as a "Font of Individual Liberties" North Carolina
Accepts the Challenge, 70 N.C. L. Rv. 1749, 1750 (1992).
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and irrelevant. Furthermore, the voters have altered the constitu-
tional framework by a simple majority vote, allowing whim, caprice,
and fear to dictate California constitutional interpretation.
On June 5, 1990, California voters passed Proposition 115, the
self-proclaimed "Crime Victims Justice Reform Act." Proposition 115
added three sections to article I of the California Constitution9 and
attempted to amend section 2410 of the same articl. 11 These sections
of Proposition 115,12 as well as sections of Proposition 8 (the "Victims'
Bill of Rights,"' 3 adopted in June 1982), altered California's criminal
justice system. Proposition 8 set forth the constitutional rights of
crime victims and Proposition 115 set forth those of the people of the
State of California.14
These constitutional amendments create clear conflicts between
the rights of criminal defendants and the rights of both crime victims
and other California citizens.15 A more subtle conflict, however, ex-
ists between the right of the voters to initiate constitutional changes
and the doctrine of independent state grounds. This conflict arises
where California state courts rely on the state constitution to define
the rights of Californians, but the voters elect to force the state to
adhere to federal definitions of similarly worded rights.
This Article addresses the process used to achieve the results of
Propositions 8 and 115. In order to achieve greater balance between
California's important, independent constitutional provisions and vot-
ers' rights, this Article proposes that the voters should be able to
change California's Declaration of Rights only by a super-majority
vote. This restriction would afford greater permanence to the funda-
mental rights set forth in California's Declaration of Rights, while still
allowing flexibility. Greater stability of rights would give California
9. CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 14.1, 29, and 30.
10. For text of § 24, see infra text accompanying note 263.
11. The California Supreme Court invalidated the proposed amendment to § 24 in
Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). See infra text accompanying notes 262-
75, 296 for a discussion of this section.
12. The Proposition also added sections to California statutes. However, this Article
will focus on the constitutional changes.
13. This Article will focus on the addition of § 28 to Article I, subpart (d), the "Truth-
in-Evidence" provision. However, Proposition 8 added other subparts to the California
Constitution.
14. CAL. CONSr. art. I, § 29 added by Proposition 115, declares the right of "the peo-
ple of the State of California... to due process of law and to a speedy and public trial."
15. For an analysis of each section of Proposition 115, see Lisa A. Lunsman, Proposi-
tion 115 - "The Crime Victims Justice Reform Act": Reformation of an Inept System or a
Constitutional Disaster?, 22 U. WEsT L.A. L. RPv. 59 (1991).
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courts the ability to independently interpret the state constitution
without being forced to adhere to federal precedent.
Part I of this Article discusses the fundamental nature of the
rights found in California's Declaration of Rights, and the need to
maintain their stability. It also discusses the problems inherent in
forcing the interpretation of California rights to follow federal inter-
pretations. Part II traces the development of the independent state
grounds doctrine in the United States, and specifically, in California.
Part III explains the history and procedure of the voter initiative in
California, while Part IV 'analyzes how Propositions 8 and 115 have
limited the ability of the California judiciary to give independent
meaning to California's Declaration of Rights. Part V examines other
proposals and concludes that a super-majority vote for changes to the
Declaration of Rights would best achieve a balance between the right
of the voters to alter the Declaration of Rights and the right to an
independent state constitution.
I. Fundamental Rights and Forced Linkage
The first general objective of this Article is to achieve an insula-
tion of fundamental rights from voter whim, passion, and fear. Pro-
positions 8 and 115 affect rights asserted primarily by criminal
defendants, which are generally unpopular rights. Motivated by per-
ceptions that California "courts.. .'have demonstrated more concern
with the rights of criminals than with the rights of innocent victims,"' 6
the voters have altered the constitution to restrict these "criminal
rights" and have taken away from California courts the ability to inde-
pendently interpret the state's constitution.
The rights set forth in California's Declaration of Rights are fun-
damental and should be permanent. A number of commentators have
emphasized the difference between constitutions and statutory law.
Justice Cardozo wrote, "[a] constitution states or ought to state not
rules for the passing hour but principles for an expanding future."'1 A
constitution should "set down fundamental and enduring first princi-
ples"" in general terms. Former Chief Justice Traynor of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, wrote that if a constitution "is to retain respect it
16. SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION 34
(June 8, 1982) (argument in favor of Proposition 8 by Mike Curb, Lieutenant Governor).
17. BENJAMIN CARDozo, THE NATURE oF Thm JUDICIAL PROCESS 24 (1921).
18. David Fellman, What Should a State Constitution Contain?, in STATE CONSTITU-
TIONAL REVISION 137,156 (W. Brooke Graves ed. 1960). See also CHAR.orrn InviNE &
EDWARD M. KRESKY, How TO STUDY A STATE CONSTITUTION 2 (1962).
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must be free from popular whim and caprice which would make of it a
mere statute."'19
With the increased use of the voter initiative, some state constitu-
tions are no more than super-statutes. Two arguments, one historical
and one structural, support the premise that the rights found in decla-
rations of rights are fundamental.
A. Historically Fundamental Rights
The rights declared in article I of the California Constitution,
similar to rights contained in other state constitutions and the Federal
Constitution, have historically been accorded "fundamental" status.20
The roots of these fundamental rights have been traced back to Eng-
lish documents such as the Magna Carta of 1215, the Petition of Right
of 1628, and the Bill of Rights of 1689.21 Although the Petition of
Right declared the fundamental rights of Englishmen, none of these
documents provided for enforcement of rights.2 In fact, the Bill of
Rights was enacted as a statute which Parliament could later amend or
repeal.3 Despite this, the rights declared in these documents later
formed "the core of the body of rights of Englishmen that American
colonists claimed as inherently their own."24 Early colonial charters,
while not enumerating rights, simply declared that the colonists re-
tained the rights of Englishmen.25 Later colonial enactments and dec-
larations began to state individual rights with greater detail.26
19. Roger Traynor, Amending the United States Constitution (1927) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of California (Berkeley)); see also Comment, California's Consti-
tutional Amendomania, 1 STAN. L. R-v. 279, 281 n.16 (1949).
20. This historical analysis is not based on how these rights were originally interpreted,
or what they were intended to mean. Historically these rights have been treated as
fundamental.
21. 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE RoOTs OF THE BILL OF RIGHTs 4-47 (1980) [herein-
after ScHwARTz, RooTs].
22. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, Tim GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND 11-14 (1977) [hereinafter
SCHWARTZ, GREAT RIGHTS].
23. Id at 1.
24. Id. at 7.
25. 1 ScHwARTZ, RooTs, supra note 21, at 53.
26. The Maryland Act for the Liberties of the People of 1639 set out the right of the
people not to be imprisoned or dispossessed of their property before being judged under
the laws of the province. Id at 67-68. The 1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties provided
for the right to counsel, id at 74, and stated that "[no] man shall be forced by Torture to
confesse any Crime against himselfe nor any other." Id at 79. The Boston List of Infringe-
ments and Violations of Rights included assertions of rights not previously declared in
other documents, particularly the violation of "[o]fficers ... break[ing] thro' the sacred'
rights of the Domicil, ransack[ing] men's houses, destroy[ing] their securities, [and]
carry[ing] off their property." Id at 199.
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Virginia's Declaration of Rights and Constitution of 1776 repre-
sents the "first true Bill of Rights in the modem American sense, since
it is the first protection for the rights of the individual to be contained
in a Constitution adopted by the people."'27 This Declaration re-
peated several rights found in previous documents, and included some
new rights, such as the right against general warrants and the freedom
of the press.' The Virginia Declaration of Rights and Constitution
served as the model for eight other states which adopted constitutions
before the Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia in
1787.29 The American draftsmen recognized the need to do more
than simply declare that the colonists possessed fundamental rights.
In contrast to their English precursors, American bills of rights pro-
vided for enforcement and insulation of "individual rights from the
changing winds of legislative fancy."'30 Their notion that certain "fun-
damental rights could not be ceded away colored the American view
of fundamental [rights] law."'3 1 The colonists and the Framers of the
Federal Constitution preserved fundamental rights from frequent al-
terations by making the amendment procedures difficult.32 While fun-
damental rights enumerated in the California Constitution may be
amended by the legislature, such an amendment must pass each house
by a two-thirds vote and must then be approved by a majority of vot-
ers. Thus, fundamental rights are afforded a greater degree of insula-
tion than simple legislative enactments.
B. The Structure of Constitutions
Generally, constitutions consist of two parts. One part of a con-
stitution sets forth the framework under which the government oper-
ates, spelling out the mechanics and delineating the powers and
27. 2 ScHwARrz, RoOTs, supra note 21, at 231.
28. Id. at 233.
29. See id. at 256-382. These states and their respective years of adoption are: Penn-
sylvania (1776), id. at 262-63; Delaware (1776), id. at 276; Maryland (1776), id. at 279;
North Carolina (1776), id. at 286; Connecticut (1776), id. at 289; Vermont (1777), id. at 319;
Massachusetts (1780), id. at 337-39; and New Hampshire (1783) id. at 374-75. The follow-
ing states did not adopt separate Bills of Rights, but adopted constitutions which contained
several guarantees of individual liberties: New Jersey (1776), id. at 256; Georgia (1777), id.
at 291; New York (1777), id. at 301, and South Carolina (1778), id. at 325. See WALTER F.
DODD, THE REvIsION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTrrutoNs 1-29 (1910).
30. ScswARz, GREAT RIGHTs, supra note 22, at 1.
31. Suzanna Sherry, The Founder's Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CIn. L. REv. 1127,
1132 (1987).
32. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V, requiring three-fourths of the states to approve any
amendment proposed by two-thirds of both houses of Congress.
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limitations on each of the three branches.33 This has been described
as the section which imposes "internal" checks and balances upon the
government. The second part of a constitution provides "external"
checks which are contained in the bills or declarations of rights.34 This
part limits the government's power over the people by declaring rights
upon which the government must not infringe.35.
The Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution'consists of amend-
ments, added in 1791, four years after the Constitution was drafted.
State constitutions adopted both before and after the convention con-
tained a declaration or bill of rights as their first article.36 These sec-
tions were separate from the sections which provided the framework
of the state government. In fact, the title of Virginia's constitution
was "Declaration of Rights and Constitution,"37 according separate
titles to the two parts. This powerfully indicates that rights listed in
declarations of rights were viewed separately and not simply as the
enactment of law or the framework of government.38
Similarly, article I of the California Constitution is entitled "Dec-
laration of Rights." By setting forth rights in the first article of the
constitution, California and other states have implicitly acknowledged
the importance of these rights.
C. What's Wrong With "Forced Linkage"?39
It makes no sense to link state constitutional interpretation of
fundamental rights to the federal interpretation of those rights. Such
an approach eviscerates state declarations of rights: if state courts
must adhere to federal definitions of rights, then state declarations of
rights become superfluous. ,
33. Michael Walzer, Constitutional Rights and the Shape of Civil Society, in THE CON-
sTrrTTON OF THE PEOPLE 113 (Robert E. Calvert ed., 1991).
34. Id. at 114.
35. ld
36. Sherry, supra note 31, at 1132-33; Robert S. Rankin, The Bill of Rights, in MAJOR
PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTrTUTIONAL REVISION 159, 160-61. (W. Brooke Graves ed.,
1960).
37. See supra text accompanying note 27.
38. Suzanna Sherry, The Early Virginia Tradition of Extra-Textual Interpretation, 53
ALB. L. REv. 297, 298-99 (1989).
39. The term "forced linkage" is used to "describe the impact of electoral decisions...
requiring state courts to equate state constitutional law with federal constitutional law."
Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida's
"Forced Linkage" Amendment, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 653, 657 (1987).
CONSTITUTON IN CONFLICIr
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David Skover has identified several other important objections to
forced linkage or "lock-step" interpretation. 4 First, where federal
precedent is ambiguous, state courts must attempt to predict how the
United States Supreme Court would resolve the particular issue.41
When the Supreme Court issues an opinion regarding a particular
right, it cannot address all possible applications and permutations of
the announced rule, and several questions must be left unanswered 2
Lower federal courts and state courts must refine the intricacies of the
ruling and hope the Supreme Court upholds their interpretations.
Without the freedom, to rely on state constitutions, state judiciaries
may become frustrated predicting the future direction of federal law.
Second, "lock-step" interpretation "is likely to disregard signifi-
cant differences in the texts of state and federal constitutional liberty
guarantees."'43 Where the wording of a particular right in a state con-
stitution is different from the wording of the analogous federal right, a
lock-step approach ignores the textual differences in favor of federal
constitutional doctrine. As such, lock-step interpretation precludes,
or at least discourages, any inquiry into the basis for textual differ-
ences and whether they might support different results.
Even where textual differences could be the basis for independ-
ent interpretation, forced linkage precludes state courts from inter-
preting textually identical guarantees independently. The result is a
"divided Constitution,"44 where some provisions are accorded an in-
dependent interpretation while others are not. For example, as a re-
sult of Propositions 8 and 115, enforcement of the state guarantees to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and from self-incrim-
ination are now linked to federal enforcement.45 The California con-
stitutional guarantees of freedom of expression,46 freedom of
religion, 4 7 and privacy,48 however, are still given interpretations in-
40. David M. Skover, Address: State Constitutional Law Interpretation: Out of "Lock-
Step" and Beyond "Reactive" Decisionmaking, 51 MoNT. L. Rnv. 243 (1990).
41. Id. at 247.
42. For examples, see Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Fed-
eralism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L. 1035, 1054-55 (1977).
43. Skover, supra note 40, at 247.
44. Id. at 248 (citing Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-The Mon-
tana Disaster, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1095, 1117-23 (1985)).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 209-14.
46. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a).
47. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; see also Melissa L. Nelson, Comment, Whose Beliefs Are
Entitled to Protection: Resolving the Conflict Between the California and Federal Standards,
27 SmA CLARA L. Rnv. 377 (1987).
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dependent of federal interpretation of similar rights.49 There is no
principled reason for linking interpretation of some rights, but not
others, to federal precedent.
H. The Doctrine of Independent State Grounds
A. Development of the Doctrine
The doctrine of independent state grounds is premised on the
idea that a state constitution, particularly. a state's declaration of
rights, is a source of rights independent of the rights set forth in the
Federal Constitution. Although the provision in the California Con-
stitution which proclaims that "[r]ights guaranteed by this Constitu-
tion are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States
Constitution,"5 was not adopted until 1974,"1 this principle predates
the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787. Before the federal
convention even began, nine of the original states had adopted in-
dependent bills of rights.52 During the Convention, George Mason
proposed that the Federal Constitution include a bill of rights, how-
ever, other delegates believed that this was not necessary, since the
state constitutions included individual rights and guarantees.5 3 Fur-
thermore, while the delegates discussed the degree of power to be re-
tained by the federal government, they affirmed that the states were
the protectors of individual liberties.54
Once the Federal Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791, it was
viewed as a restraint only upon the federal government, and was not
binding upon the states.55 During this time, individuals had to look to
their state constitutions to protect their rights. This period of time has
been called the period of "dual federalism. 51 6
48. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. See also Robert S. Gerstein, California's Constitutional
Right to Privacy: The Development of the Protection of Private Rights, 9 HASTrNGs CONST.
L.Q. 385 (1982).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
50. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 24.
51. This was a constitutional measure passed by the legislature and approved by the
voters in a referendum.
52. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
53. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 588
(1987).
54. 2 SCHWARTz, RooTs, supra note 21, at 436; 3 FARRAm, supra note 53, at 254.
55. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833).
56. Slobogin, supra note 39, at 657 n.11.
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After the Civil War, the federal government stepped in to protect
individual rights against the abuses of state power5 7 by adopting the
Fourteenth Amendment.58 The United States Supreme Court slowly
began to give meaning to the Due Process Clause by examining
whether certain fights provided for in the Federal Constitution were
fundamental and applicable to the states. This period of incorpora-
tion began with Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago59 in
which the Supreme Court determined that the Takings Clause60 ap-
plied to the states pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.61 The Court reasoned that just compensation for
the taking of private property for public use is an "essential element
of due process of law."62 In Gitlow v. New York,63 the Justices simply
stated that they "may and do assume that freedom of speech and of
the press.., are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States."' 6 The Court eventually concluded
that all sections of the First Amendment applied to the states.65 The
Supreme Court was notably slower in applying rights embodied in the
Fourth,66 Fifth,67 Sixth,68 and Eighth69 Amendments, the "criminal
57. Wdliam J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N. Y. U. L. RBv. 535, 537 (1986).
58. The Amendment states, in part, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
59. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
60. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
61. Chicago, 166 U.S. at 253.
62. Id.
63. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
64. Id. at 666.
65. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (limiting the use of
state libel laws by public officials and public figures); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (barring state-required prayers in public schools).
66. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend.
IV.
67. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger,
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; ... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONsr. amend.
V.
68. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
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rights,"70 to the states. One of the first cases to consider the applica-
tion of these amendments to the states was Hurtardo v. California71.
In Hurtardo, the Court determined that the Fifth Amendment re-
quirement of a grand jury indictment did not apply to the states.72
Several years later, the Court determined in Twining v. New Jersey73
that the privilege against self-incrimination, though important, was
merely a rule of evidence and not a "fundamental principle of liberty
and justice,"'74 and therefore not within the meaning of due process.
While the Warren Court7' is usually credited with incorporating
nearly all criminal procedural rights to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, incorporation of these
rights actually began in 1923. In Moore v. Dempsey,76 the Supreme
Court found that the right to a fair trial was protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.77 Later, in Powell v.
Alabama,78 the Supreme Court found that due process requires that
criminal defendants in capital cases receive effective assistance of
counsel, and applied this requirement to the states.79 In 1949, the
Court extended the Fourth Amendment's protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures to the states.8 Finally, between the
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
69. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
70. The rights set forth in these amendments are usually asserted by criminal defend-
ants. However, these rights protect all people in the United States. It is unfortunate that
these rights are treated as belonging only to those accused of crime. If, for example, police
conduct an illegal search in which they do not find any evidence of a crime and they do not
arrest the individual whose rights they have violated, the only way the individual may pres-
ently vindicate her rights is to seek administrative relief or file a civil suit, neither of which
is a very powerful remedy. Less than avid protection of "criminal rights" has led to a
diminution of rights for all. For example, state police have begun stopping motorists and
then strongly suggesting that the motorist consent to a vehicle search. In South Carolina,
out of 4,000 cars searched in 1991, drugs were discovered in less than 15%. In Penn-
sylvania, out of 583 stops, 108 resulted in arrests. Joe Hallinan, Latest Drug War Tactic:
Car Searches on Highway, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 6, 1992, at A4.
71. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
72. Id. at 538.
73. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
74. Id. at 106.
75. Earl Warren was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1953 to 1969.
76. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
77. Id. at 91.
78. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
79. Id. at 111.
80. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). This guarantee was meaningless until the
Court also applied the exclusionary rule to state proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
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years 1962 and 1969, the Warren Court applied eight different crimi-
nal procedural rights to the states.8 '
Commentators have noted that during this period of rapid "feder-
alization" of rights, state courts stopped looking to their own constitu-
tional guarantees because it was "easy for the state courts... to fall
into the drowsy habit of looking no further than federal constitutional
law. ''82 Furthermore, states often had not provided for some rights to
the extent demanded by the Due Process Clause. As a result, the
Supreme Court raised state protection to the federal level. Not sur-
prisingly, most state courts looked to the guarantees pronounced by
the United States Supreme Court and simply fell in line with that
Court's interpretation, not considering what their own state constitu-
tion required.83 This era has been termed "co-option." 84 State courts
simply co-opted the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
rights.
Beginning with the term of Chief Justice Burger85 and continuing
with that of Chief Justice Rehnquist,86 the United States Supreme
Court began to restrict the scope of the Federal Bill of Rights.Y7 As a
result, state courts were motivated to look to their own constitutional
guarantees instead of automatically relying on the federal
counterparts.88
(1961). William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 493 (1977).
81. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishment);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (assistance of counsel in all prosecutions); Mal-
loy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965) (accused's right to confront witnesses against her); Klopfer v. North Caro-
lina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy and public trial); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S.
363 (1966) (right to trial by an impartial jury); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)
(right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969) (bar against double jeopardy). Brennan, supra note 80, at 493-94.
82. A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger
Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 878 (1976).
83. Slobogin, supra note 39, at 661.
84. Id. at 657.
85. After Earl Warren, Warren Burger was Chief Justice until 1987.
86. William Rehnquist became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1987.
87. See generally Slobogin, supra note 39, at 661-62 n.47; Howard, supra note 82, at
874-76; Michael G. Colantuono, Note, The Revision of American State Constitutions: Leg-
islative Power, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1473 n.1
(1987).
88. Brennan, supra note 80, at 495-502; Brennan, supra note 57, at 548; Hans A. Linde,
First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980);
Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 Tax. L. REv.
1081, 1088-91 (1985) [hereinafter Mosk, State Constitutionalism]; Stanley Mosk, California
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CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT
Although California's constitution was drafted fifty-eight years
after the Federal Bill of Rights, the drafters of California's Declara-
tion of Rights did not rely exclusively on the first ten amendments to
the United States Constitution. The drafters of the 1849 California
Constitution were aware that in Barron v. Baltimore, 9 the United
States Supreme Court had announced that the guarantees embodied
in the Federal Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. Therefore,
while certain guarantees contained in California's Declaration of
Rights are similar to their federal counterparts, the drafters recog-
nized that the California Declaration of Rights and not the Federal
Bill of Rights would be the source of guarantees for the people of
California.
Interestingly, the 1879 version of the California Constitution ini-
tially included a section which declared the United States Constitution
to be "the great charter of our liberties;" this language, however, was
later rejected. 90 Furthermore, while it has been stated that the protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures "equals the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution," 91 other evidence indi-
cates that the original language of the Declaration of Rights was in
fact derived from the New York and Iowa Constitutionsf 2 Even if the
provisions were intended to be identical to the Federal Constitution,
this may simply be a result of the drafters agreement with the princi-
ples set forth in the Federal Bill of Rights, and not evidence of the
drafters intent that the California courts adopt and follow federal in-
terpretations of similar language. In fact, evidence indicates that the
drafters recognized the state judiciary would define the parameters of
those provisions.93
Constitutional Symposium: Introduction, 17 HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1989) [hereinafter
Mosk, Symposium].
89. 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833).
90. SWISHER, MOTIVATION AND PoLmcAL TECHNIQUE IN Tm CALIFoRNIA CONSTI-
TUONAL CONVENTION 1878-1879 93 (1930). The California Constitution contains lan-
guage similar to the above: "The State of California is an inseparable part of the United
States of America, and the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land."
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1. This, however, sounds more like a recognition of the Supremacy
Clause.
91. Ira Reiner & George Glenn Size, The Law Through a Looking Glass: Our
Supreme Court and the Use and Abuse of the California Declaration of Rights, 23 PAC. LJ.
1183, 1211 (1992).
92. ROCKWELL D. HUNT, THE GENESIS oF CALIORNIA's FIRST CONSTITUTION (1846-
1849) 56 (1973); Joseph R. Grodin, Some Reflections on State Constitutions, 15 HAsn os
CONST. L.Q. 391, 393 (1988).
93. Jerome B. Falk, Jr., The Supreme Court of California 1971-1972 Foreward, the State
Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CA. L. REv. 273, 283
(1973).
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B. Application of the Doctrine in California
1. Dual Federalism
The period called "dual federalism" 94 exemplifies the early appli-
cation of the doctrine of independent state grounds. During this pe-
riod, the United States Supreme Court had not yet required the states
to follow the Federal Bill of Rights. California has been described as
having lead "the nation in the development of independent interpreta-
tion."'95 Many of the fundamental rights protections the California
Supreme Court premised on the state constitution presaged those the
United States Supreme Court later found in the Federal Constitution.
For example, the California Supreme Court invalidated the death pen-
alty in People v. Anderson9 6 four months before Furman v. Georgia97
was decided. In Anderson, the court found that the drafters of the
California Constitution purposefully drafted the phrase "cruel or unu-
sual punishment"98 rather than the "cruel and unusual"9 9 language of
the Federal Constitution. The court also looked to the history of the
state constitutional convention and found that the drafters of the con-
stitution intended to prohibit the use of capital punishment."° In
1955, six years before the United States Supreme Court applied the
exclusionary rule to the states, 0 1 the California Supreme Court
adopted the rule."°2 The California Supreme Court also determined
that a defendant may object to the admission of evidence obtained in
violation of another persons' rights,0 3 despite the fact that no such
right had been recognized under the Federal Constitution. °4 In inter-
preting California's guarantee against double jeopardy, the state
94. Slobogin supra note 39, at 657 (citing Walker, American Federalism - Then and
Now, in THE BooK OF STATES 23,23 (1982)).
95. Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism." Toward a Principled Interpretation
of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. Rv. 297, 301 (1977); see generally Falk, supra note
93; David J. Fine, et al. Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv. 271, 325 (1973).
96. 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
97. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty).
98. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 17 (emphasis added).
99. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
100. California voters subsequently overruled Anderson by passing a referendum the
following November which amended the constitution by stating, in part, "Itihe death pen-
alty ... shall not be deemed to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual
punishment." CAt. CONST. art. I, § 27.
101. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
102. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).
103. People v. Martin, 290 P.2d 855 (Cal. 1955). This is known as the vicarious exclu-
sionary rule.
104. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1941).
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supreme court held that when a defendant does not consent to a mis-
trial, another trial would put the defendant twice in jeopardy.10 5 This
ruling predated the incorporation of the federal right against double
jeopardy,"ce and contradicted an earlier Supreme Court decision inter-
preting the federal right.Y" However, California's period of "dual
federalism" also involved many abuses by the state judiciary in the
area of criminal rights.'08
The California Supreme Court gave state constitutional protec-
tion to a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy'0 9 four years before
the United States Supreme Court recognized the right under the Fed-
eral Constitution." 0
The recognition of these rights by California courts occurred
before the United States Supreme Court had spoken on the issues,
thus legitimizing the doctrine of independent state grounds. Without
the doctrine, state courts would either have to wait until the United
State Supreme Court has examined the issue, or guess as to how the
Court might resolve the particular issue."'
The following cases illustrate the persuasive use of the independ-
ent state grounds doctrine by a California Supreme Court not bound
by federal case law.
In the 1955 case of People v. Cahan," 2 the California Supreme
Court revisited the issue of whether or not to adopt the exclusionary
105. Cardenas v. Superior Court, 363 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1961).
106. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
107. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
108. See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) (defendant questioned for 48
hours, slapped, and held without indictment or arrest warrant); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) (defendant's stomach pumped to obtain narcotic capsules); Irvine v. Cali-
fornia, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (police entered defendant's home in his absence and wired it
for electronic surveillance).
109. People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
110. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
111. In a recent state appellate court case concerning the application of Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to gender-based peremptory jury challenges, the state court con-
cluded that since the United States Supreme Court had not yet extended Batson to gender-
based peremptory challenges, it "would be presumptuous on our part" to extend Batson.
Eiland v. State, 607 A.2d 42,59 (Md. Ct. Spec.App. 1992). However, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland reversed the Court of Special Appeals, relying on the state constitution. "Iyler
v. State, 623 A.2d 648 (Md. 1993). The United States Supreme Court has since agreed to
review a case involving a state's use of peremptory strikes to exclude all men from the jury.
J.E.B v. T.B., 660 So. 2d 156 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S.Ct. 2330 (May 17,
1993).
112. 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).
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rule."3 Only thirteen years earlier in People v. Gonzales,"4 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had declined to follow the federal courts in
adopting the exclusionary rule, despite the fact that the language pro-
tecting individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures in the
state and federal constitutions is nearly identical.115 In overturning its
own precedent, the California Supreme Court looked to the language
of prior United States Supreme Court decisions to determine whether
a majority of states had adopted the rule. The court then indepen-
dently addressed the policy arguments involved, stating that "one of
the foremost public concerns is the police state, and recent history has
demonstrated all too clearly how short the step is from lawless
although efficient enforcement of the law to the stamping out of
human rights.""' 6 The court went on to state that "[e]xperience has
demonstrated.., that neither administrative, criminal nor civil reme-
dies are effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures. The
innocent suffer with the guilty, and we cannot close our eyes to the
effect the rule we adopt will have on the rights of those not before the
court.""11 7 Acknowledging that the language of the California protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures is nearly identical to
its federal counterpart, the court stated that "[i]n developing a rule of
evidence applicable in the state courts, this court is not bound by the
decisions that have applied the federal rule, and if it appears that
those decisions have developed needless refinements and distinctions,
this court need not follow them.""18 Though the California Supreme
Court looked to United States Supreme Court precedent for persua-
sive value, it found important reasons to reject the federal authority.
In the same year that Cahan was decided, the California Supreme
Court unanimously adopted the so-called "vicarious exclusionary
rule," which the United States Supreme Court had rejected in 1942."19
113. Although the United States Supreme Court had applied the rights guaranteed in
the Fourth Amendment to the states in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), it was not
until 1961 that the states were bound by the exclusionary rule. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
114. 124 P.2d 44 (Cal. 1942).
115. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... ." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated ... ." CA. CONSr.
art. I, § 13.
116. Cahan, 282 P.2d at 912.
117. 1& at 913.
118. Id. at 915.
119. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114-17 (1942); see also Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 171 (1969).
fVol. 21:95
CONSITUTION IN CONFLICr
The California Supreme Court in People v. Martin 2" determined that
a defendant may object to the admission of evidence obtained in vio-
lation of another person's rights." 1 The Martin court examined the
federal exclusionary rule and stated that its rationale was based on
providing a remedy for a defendant who had been wronged."22 Based
on Cahan, the court reasoned that the California exclusionary rule is
grounded in three ideas: (1) that other remedies are not effective; (2)
that the government should not be able to profit from its own wrong-
doing; and (3) that the courts should not sanction such wrongdoing by
admitting at trial the illegally obtained evidence." Martin demon-
strates that although the California -Supreme Court had adopted the
exclusionary rule, in part based on federal precedent, the court was
not bound to follow the United States Supreme Court interpretation
of the rule, and after careful consideration, chose not to.
Cases that involve protection against double jeopardy provide yet
another example of "pure independent interpretation."" 4 The Cali-
fornia Declaration of Rights provides that "[p]ersons may not twice
be put in jeopardy for the same offense.... ."I'2 The federal counter-
part provides "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
[sic] to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . ..,12 Before the
United States Supreme Court applied the federal provision to the
states in 1969,127 the California Supreme Court addressed the question
of whether a second trial would subject a defendant to double jeop-
ardy when the trial court declares a mistrial sua sponte without the
defendant's consent. The United States Supreme Court had deter-
mined in Gori v. United States,1 8 that such a scenario would not vio-
late the federal guarantee against double jeopardy. Despite this
federal precedent, in 1961, in Cardenas v. Superior Court,29 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court ruled that a second trial would place the de-
fendant in double jeopardy. The California Supreme Court has
120. 290 P.2d 855 (Cal. 1955).
121. Id. at 857.
122. Id.
123. Id. While the court in Martin determined that the defendant had standing to ob-
ject to the admission of the evidence, the court ultimately decided that the evidence, in that
case, had not been illegally obtained. Id, at 858.
124. Johanson, supra note 95, at 306.
125. CAT. CO NST. art. 1, § 15.
126. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
127. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
128. 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
129. 363 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1961).
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maintained and upheld the Cardenas standard, 3 ° even after the
United States Supreme Court incorporated the federal guarantee.
These examples illustrate the capabilities of the California
Supreme Court when it is not bound by the United States Constitu-
tion."' These are legitimate and persuasive uses of the state constitu-
tion. Because federal precedent was not binding, the California
Supreme Court looked to federal case law for persuasive guidance. It
adopted those precedents only after careful analysis. Furthermore,
upon adopting a federal precedent, the California Supreme Court did
not bind itself to future pronouncements by the United States
Supreme Court on the same subject. Instead, the court examined fed-
eral precedent, much as it would look to the precedents of sister states
for guidance.
2. New Federalism
Under Chief Justice Burger's leadership, the United States
Supreme Court curtailed many of the "progressive" standards
adopted by the Warren Court. 32 The California Supreme Court re-
sponded by resurrecting the doctrine of independent state grounds.
This phase, dating from the early 1970s, has been termed the "New
Federalism."' 33
Critics charged that since California had already adopted the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of particular rights, the
California Supreme Court's sudden reassertion of the doctrine was re-
sult-oriented. The criticism notwithstanding, the California Supreme
Court employed independent state grounds legitimately. The court
failed, however, to persuade the voters of California that the results
followed logically and historically from California precedent. The
court also failed to explain the analysis which it would apply in the
future when relying on the state constitution.
130. Curry v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 345 (Cal. 1970).
131. I do not disagree with the incorporation of federal rights through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Without such initiative by the United States
Supreme Court, individuals would have continued to suffer abuses and lawless behavior at
the hands of most states. These examples illustrate the beneficial reliance upon state con-
stitutions when individuals could not rely upon federal guarantees.
132. See Martin, supra note 8, at 1749.
133. Slobogin, supra note 39, at 657; Peter J. Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and
the Alaska Supreme Court: Criminal Procedure Rights and the New Federalism 1960-1981,
18 GoNz. L. REv. 221 (1982-83); DoNALD E. Wnics JR., The New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure in 1984: Death of the Phoenix?, in DEvELOPMENrs IN STATE CONsTIMIONAL
LAW 166 (1985); Johansen, supra note 95, at 297.
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In People v. Brisendine,'" the California Supreme Court ad-
dressed the scope of the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures.1 35 Two years earlier, the United States Supreme Court
had determined that police officers may, in a search incident to arrest,
look inside containers incapable of holding a weapon-specifically, a
crumpled cigarette package found in the defendant's shirt pocket.136
Finding no Fourth Amendment violation, the United States Supreme
Court held that the trial court could admit the seized evidence at the
defendant's trial.137 The California Supreme Court declined to follow
the United States Supreme Court holding, and determined that while
an officer may conduct a search for weapons, no reason exists to
search the contents of containers incapable of holding weapons, such
as an opaque colored bottle and envelopes. 13 8 To support its conclu-
sion, the California Supreme Court discussed how the independent
nature of the state constitution allowed the court to reach a conclusion
different from that of the United States Supreme Court.139 Justice
Mosk summarized the history of the early bills of rights of the states,
and explained that only the state constitution offered protection from
the abuses of local officials."4 Writing for the four to three majority,
Justice Mosk justified the court's ability to impose higher standards on
searches and seizures under the California Constitution. He cited sec-
tion 24 of article one, which states: "[r]ights guaranteed by this Consti-
tution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. This declaration of rights may not be construed to im-
pair or deny others retained by the people."'' Justice Mosk also re-
lied on People v. Superior Court (Simon),142 a California case decided
before the United States Supreme Court had ruled on the issue. In
Simon, the California Supreme Court determined that when a defend-
ant is cited for an offense which typically has neither "instrumentali-
ties" or "fruits," a search is not justified unless there are facts which
lead an officer to believe the defendant is armed. 43 However, Simon
was not expressly based on the California Constitution. Rather, in
134. 531 P.2d 1099 (Cal. 1975).
135. Id at 1105-15.
136. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
137. Id
138. Brisendine, 531 P.2d at 1109.
139. Id at 1112.
140. Id. at 1113.
141. Id. at 1114.
142. 496 P.2d 1205 (Cal. 1972).
143. Id. at 1217.
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Simon the court relied on both federal and state law.1" Therefore,
although Justice Mosk implied that the court could go beyond the fed-
eral minimum, simply asserting this right alone did not further the le-
gitimacy of the doctrine of independent state grounds, especially when
the doctrine had yet to become a routine and accepted practice.
The Brisendine court missed a unique opportunity to persuade
Californians not only that the independent state grounds doctrine is
valid, but also that California case law mandates a result different
from the federal rule. Moreover, the court declined to state any prin-
ciples or rules by which one could determine when the California
Constitution would mandate a result contrary to federal interpreta-
tions of similar language.
The California Supreme Court should have explained that prior
California cases relying on federal precedent implicitly made that pre-
cedent a part of the state's law, and that the California Constitution
required the court to maintain the prior, more stringent standards.
The court also should have stated that, in the future, when an issue of
constitutional law arose, the court would first look to what the Cali-
fornia constitutional, statutory, and case law required. Of course, this
tactic may have been more successful had the California Supreme
Court been applying the doctrine routinely and consistently through-
out the days of incorporation and during the Warren Court era, and if
when adopting federal decisions, the court adopted them as part of
California state law.
Former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde's approach is
more persuasive and more deferential to state constitutional indepen-
dence. Under this approach, state courts first look to their own con-
stitutions and how the courts of their state have interpreted the
language of the state constitution. Unless this interpretation violates
the Federal Constitution, the state court's inquiry should end. 45
The court later missed another opportunity to delineate standards
for the application of the doctrine of independent state grounds. In
People v. Disbrow,46 the court held that statements obtained by the
police in violation of Miranda v. Arizona'47 could not be admitted for
the purpose of impeaching the defendant on cross-examination."4
The United States Supreme Court had previously held that such state-
144. Id at 1216-21.
145. Linde, supra note 88, at 387.
146. 545 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1976).
147. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
148. Disbrow, 545 P.2d at 392.
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ments were admissible to impeach the defendant in Harris v. New
York.14 9 The California Supreme Court was once again in the awk-
ward position of disagreeing with the United States Supreme Court, as
well as having to overrule itself.150 The court extensively analyzed
case law before Harris as well as Harris itself and concluded that it
disagreed with its rule.15' The court then pointed to other courts
which refused to adopt the Harris rule."5 2 Finally, the court stated
"[w]e pause finally to reaffirm the independent nature of the Califor-
nia Constitution and our responsibility to separately define and pro-
tect the rights of California citizens despite conflicting decisions of the
United States Supreme Court interpreting the Federal
Constitution.' 53
Once again, the mere recitation of its power to interpret the Cali-
fornia Constitution independently did little to promote the acceptance
and legitimacy of the doctrine of independent state grounds. The
opinion would have been more persuasive if the court had detailed the
significance of the doctrine of independent state grounds and stated
why California case law mandated the result reached. The court
should have enunciated a standard for analyzing issues under the Cali-
fornia, rather than the Federal, Constitution.
It is unfortunate that the California Supreme Court was insensi-
tive to the need to persuade the people of California of the impor-
tance of maintaining the integrity and independence of the California
Constitution. Even early on, the voters indicated their disagreement
with the court when they effectively overturned the court's interpreta-
tion in People v. Anderson'54 of California's protection against "cruel
or unusual punishment."'15 The court should have taken this as a sig-
nal that it had to be more persuasive, and even take on an educational
role, explaining the importance of the state's constitution and the par-
ticular rights which it interpreted.
C. Criticisms of the Doctrine in California
Had the California Supreme Court been more consistent and per-
suasive in its application of the doctrine, perhaps we would not now
149. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
150. In People v. Nudd, 524 P.2d 844 (Cal. 1974), by a 4-3 vote, the court had followed
the Harris rule.
151. Disbrow, 545 P.2d at 280.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
155. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
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be faced with the present conflict between the right of the voters to
change the constitution and the doctrine of independent state
grounds. However, some critics argue that where the language of the
California and Federal Constitution is nearly identical, the doctrine
only applies when circumstances peculiar to California exist to justify
a different result. 5 6 It follows from this that an application of the
doctrine consistent with state precedent would be irrelevant and that
state courts should follow federal precedent even where this would
require overturning state precedent. As far back as 1938, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker,57 stated that:
[s]tate courts in interpreting provisions of the state constitution
are not necessarily concluded by an interpretation placed on
similar provisions in the federal constitution... But... cogent
reasons must exist before a state court in construing a provision
of the state constitution will depart from the construction placed
by the Supreme Court of the United States on a similar provi-
sion in the federal constitution. 58
In Gabrielli, the court determined that the requirement that all school
students salute the United States flag was not a violation of the stu-
dent's guarantee of freedom of religion.159 Without providing much
state law analysis, the court concluded that since the United States
Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in two similar cases, the
Supreme Court did not find a constitutional violation.
Although critics of the California Supreme Court's use of the
doctrine of independent state grounds might rely upon Gabrielli, it is
of little analytical value; the court in Gabrielli did not provide any
meaningful guidance as to the parameters of the doctrine of independ-
ent state grounds. The criticism rests on the notion that the California
Constitution is independent only if it is in some way different or "pe-
culiar" from the United States Constitution. It ignores the signifi-
156. George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No Anchor - Judi-
cial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HAsTmGS CONSr. L.Q. 975, 988, n.91
(1979); John K. Van de Kamp and Richard W. Gerry, Reforming the Exclusionary Rule
An Analysis of Two Proposed Amendments to the California Constitution, 33 HASTINGS
LJ. 1109, 1117 (1982); see also People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 283-84 (Cal. 1976) (Rich-
ardson, J., dissenting); People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1116-17 (Cal. 1975) (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
157. 82 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1938).
158. Id. at 392-93 (emphasis added); see also People v. Norman, 538 P.2d 237,246 (Cal.
1975) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("unless conditions peculiar to California support a different
meaning," California courts should follow federal precedent).
159. Id. at 392. The California constitutional counterpart to the Federal Religion
Clause reads: "Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or prefer-
ence are guaranteed... .The Legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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cance of section 24 of article I which declares the independence of the
state declaration of rights. However, if constitutional independence is
to rest on some state peculiarity, California courts could justify a
broader application of the exclusionary rule in cases like Disbrow and
Brisendine by referring to the right to privacy expressly provided for
in the California Constitution.160 Other states have relied on an ex-
press constitutional privacy right as the basis for expanded rights.16'
Although the California Supreme Court has been reluctant to rely on
this right with respect to criminal rights, 62 this express provision
could, as a circumstance peculiar to California, justify broader
rights. 63 The court would not have to define explicitly the rights to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures and against self-incrimi-
nation in terms of privacy. Rather, the court could, after discussing
California case law interpreting these rights, point to the express right
of privacy to justify broader protections in the areas of searches and
seizures and self-incrimination.
Another criticism of the doctrine is that, having already adopted
federal standards, state courts are in some way bound to future deci-
sions interpreting the same constitutional provision.' This argument
ignores the proper effect of the federal standards in state laws. For
instance, when a court adopts a case from another jurisdiction, that
court is not then bound by subsequent cases decided by the other juris-
diction which may alter the original decision. This subsequent case
law is merely persuasive. 65
160. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and pro-
tecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
161. See State v. Solis, 693 P.2d 518 (Mont. 1984) (relying on art. II § 10 of the Montana
Constitution and holding that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy as to face to face
conversations and government recordings will not be admitted at trial, even where one
party has consented to the recording; cf United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979));
State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska. 1985) (relying on art. I § 22 of the Alaska Constitu-
tion and holding that the Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) "totality of the circum-
stances" test for reviewing an affidavit for a warrant does not adequately protect state
constitutional rights to privacy against unreasonable searches and seizures).
162. Cf. People v. Williams, 128 Cal.App.3d. 981, 985 (1982) (noting that the California
Supreme Court has not explained the relationship between the constitutional right of pri-
vacy and the right to be free from unreasonable seizures and searches); Lewis A. Korn-
hauser, Comment, Privacy: The New Constitutional Language and the Old Right, The
Supreme Court of California 1974-1975, 64 CAt. L. REv. 347, 356-61 (1976).
163. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 156.
165. See, eg., HARRY W. JoNEs nr. A., LEGAL METHOD 5-8 (2d ed. 1980).
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EII. The Voter Initiative
A. The History
In 1913, former President and United States Supreme Court Jus-
tice William Taft predicted that "the movement [to direct democracy]
will come to an end by the non-use of the referendum, as the people
shall see the absurdities into which it is likely to lead them."' 66 Con-
trary to Taft's prediction, twenty-three states now allow the use of the
initiative and referendum. 67 Since 1898, there have been more than
17,000 propositions placed on state ballots. 68 Although the use of
this direct democracy has gone through periods of little or no use, it
has become immensely popular.1 69
The progressive reformers of the first two decades of this century
promoted the use of the initiative and referendum as tools to advance
direct democracy.170 The reforms advocated by the progressives were
intended to "[g]ive the government back to the people"'171 due to the
growing distrust of political organizations. The initiative, referendum,
recall, and direct primary were intended to infuse representative gov-
ernment with a degree of direct democracy. 172 At the core of these
reforms was the belief that citizen involvement in government would
improve government and limit the power of special interests.173
The Progressive Movement came to California in 1908.174 The
1879 California Constitution already required public ratification of
constitutional amendments as well as referral of certain topics to the
voters. 7 s The "Progressives" in California, a faction of the California
Republican party, sought to achieve greater voter influence and con-
trol in an effort to limit the power of special interest groups and re-
166. WILAM H. TAFT, POPULAR GoVERNMENT 71 (1913).
167. DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CmzN LAwMAKERs: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLU-
TION 40 (1989).
168. DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIncr LEGISLATION: VOTING OF BALLOT PROPOSITIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES 70 (1984).
169. SCHMmT, supra note 167, at 15-23; MAGLEBY, supra note 168, at 5.
170. MAGLEBY, supra note 168, at 20; WINSTON W. CRoUCH ET AL., CALIFORNIA Gov-
ERNMENT AND POLITICS 93 (3d ed. 1964).
171. MAGLEBY, supra note 168, at 21.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 22. However, Magleby also questions the true motivation behind the Pro-
gressive movement. Id. at 24-25 (citing RICHARD HOFSTADER, THE AGE OF REFORM 131-
73 (1955) (suggesting that many Progressives were middle-class, urban, well educated, and
often self-employed businesspeople, and that the reforms sought were merely a way to
increase their influence on public policy)).'
174. CROUCH, supra note 170, at 93.
175. Id. at 94.
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duce corruption by political machines.176 More specifically, popular
disgust with Boss Herren and the Southern Pacific political machine
fueled the spark for reform. 177 After successfully prosecuting Abra-
ham Ruef, a San Francisco political boss, Hiram W. Johnson was
elected Governor of California. 78 Johnson promoted the successful
adoption of progressive reforms in California, including the voter
initiative.
B. The Process
In California, an individual or a group may draft amendments to
the state constitution or statutory law.'7 9 After drafting a proposed
amendment, the proponents submit it to the Attorney General who
prepares a title and a summary of the measure and certifies the initia-
tive. 80 The proponents then have 150 days to gather a number of
signatures, based on a percentage of the electoral votes cast in the
most recent gubernatorial election.' 8 ' To place a statutory change on
the ballot requires five percent of the vote,182 while a constitutional
amendment requires eight percent.8 3 Once on the ballot, the initia-
tive will be adopted if a simple majority of the voters voting on the
specific initiative opt to accept it.184 There are a few restrictions on
proposals. First, "[ain initiative measure embracing more than one
subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect."'8 5
Further, the California Supreme Court has interpreted the California
Constitution to require that all of a proposition's parts be "reasonably
germane."'1 6 Second, an initiative to amend the constitution will not
be effective if it amounts to a revision of the constitution.' s7 Finally,
176. Eugene C. Lee, California, in RnRENDuMs: A CoMiPARATrVE STUDY oF PRAC-
TICE AND THEORY 87, 88-89 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1978).
177. CRouch, supra note 170, at 94.
178. Id. at 54.
179. The California Constitution allows individuals to submit statutory changes to the
voters as well. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8. However, the focus here is on constitutional
amendments by initiative.
180. I&
181. CAL. EIEc. CODE § 3513 (West 1977).
182. CAL. CoNsT. art. II, § 8(b).
183. Id.
184. For a description of requirements in other states, see MAGLEBY, supra note 168, at
38-40, tbl. 3.1.
185. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 8(d).
186. Perry v. Jordan, 207 P.2d 47,50 (Cal. 1949); Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch.
Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1290 (Cal. 1978).
187. McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 789 (Cal. 1948). For more discussion of this
limitation, see infra text accompanying notes 258-74.
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constitutional amendments must not violate the United States
Constitution. 88
C. The Problems
From 1911, when the initiative was enacted in California, to 1988,
179 initiatives were placed on the statewide ballot'8 9 One hundred
and three of those initiatives proposed constitutional amendments. 90
Californians have clearly taken advantage of their right to participate
in the government of their state, and studies indicate that the initiative
has reduced voter apathy and increased political awareness and partic-
ipation.191 Nonetheless, the voter initiative is not a political panacea
and it has drawn recurrent criticism. While some of these criticisms
are interrelated, this Article focuses primarily on those relevant to the
thesis, although other criticisms are considered briefly.
The first criticism of the voter initiative states that a substantial
number of people eligible to vote are unable to comprehend the nu-
merous and complex initiatives on which they must make a deci-
sion.' 92 Most propositions require that readers have the reading level
of a third-year college student. 93 Even if a voter has the level of edu-
cation necessary to understand the initiatives, it is unlikely that the
voter is able to devote the amount of time necessary to understand the
proposed initiatives. Unlike elected representatives, whose full-time
employment includes analyzing proposed legislation, members of the
electorate may find it difficult to devote much time to examining the
voter handbook containing the proposed new law.'94
Another criticism is that not all eligible voters vote on initiatives;
thus, those who do vote effectively represent everyone else. Due to
low voter turnout, the initiative process effectively becomes represen-
tative government, and representative government is precisely what
direct democracy seeks to avoid. The problem is that the initiative
188. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); see also Gordon E. Baker, American
Conceptions of Direct Ws-a-Ws Representative Governance, 5 CLAREMONT J. PUB. AFF. 9-
10 (1977); James J. Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislation: Post-
script to Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 881, 890 (1970).
189. PHILIP L. DUBOIS AND FLOYD F. FEENEY, IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA INrITA-
nvn PROCESS: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 16-17, tbl. 3 (1992).
190. Id
191. MAGLEBY, supra note 168, at 13-14.
192. Id. at 138-39.
193. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L. 1503, 1509
(1990).
194. DAVID BUTLER & AUSTI RANNEY, Theory, in REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATivE
STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 34 (1978).
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process does not possess the same checks as representative govern-
ment. The legislative process provides the opportunity to deliberate,
debate, revise, and compromise before representatives vote on the fi-
nal version of a bill. To enact a change in California statutory law, a
bill must obtain a majority vote from each house.195 Amending the
California Constitution requires a two-thirds vote from each house
before the proposal goes before the voters; the constitutional amend-
ment becomes law only if it receives a majority vote at the polls.' 96
By contrast, the initiative process circumvents the "deliberate and
debate" stage. Once the Attorney General has certified a measure,
there may be only limited changes to the language of the initiative,197
permitting few compromises and requiring the voters to accept or re-
ject the measure as presented. Passage of an initiative requires only a
majority vote, regardless of whether the measure proposes statutory
or constitutional changes.' 98
Another problem with the initiative is that it no longer serves one
of its original purposes. The initiative process as originally conceived
was meant to avoid the domination of the legislature by powerful in-
terest groups. 199 Today, however, interest groups dominate the initia-
tive process.200
A final and most significant criticism is that constitutional change
by voter initiative allows for unchecked "majority tyranny." As dis-
cussed, declarations of rights protect fundamental rights from state in-
trusion. The initiative process endangers those rights, however, by
raising the possibility that popular will may restrict unpopular rights.
This is especially true with respect to rights thought of as belonging
only to criminal defendants. Because these rights are especially sus-
ceptible to popular passions and fears, it is even more important to
insulate them from voter whim. While voters should have the oppor-
tunity to change the constitution, this right should be somewhat re-
stricted in order to preserve the fundamental rights of all
Californians.2 °'
195. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(b).
196. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
197. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3505 (West Supp. 1993).
198. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 54 (West 1977)
199. Lee, supra note 176, at 88-89.
200. JosEPH R. GRODIN, IN Pusurr oF JusTrcE 103 (1989).
201. Unfortunately, the popular perspective tends to be one of outrage when a defend-
ant "gets off on a technicality." The "technicality," however, is often that the state has in
some way violated the defendant's rights. For example, the police may have conducted an
illegal search of the defendant's home. In such a situation the exclusionary rule operates to
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The major criticisms of the initiative do not address the need for
preserving the independence of the California Constitution. While
the majority may vote to curtail unpopular rights, they may do so only
to the extent that such changes do not fall below the level of protec-
tion provided for in the Federal Constitution. If voters continue to
adopt "forced linkage" of federal interpretation of federal rights, the
California Declaration of Rights will be superfluous.
IV. Propositions 8 and W5 - Voter Backlash
A. The Backlash
During the "New Federalism" period, the California Supreme
Court consistently declined opportunities to bolster the legitimacy of
the doctrine of independent state grounds and further declined to em-
phasize that the California Constitution mandates results independent
of United States Supreme Court decisions.2a2 This mistake spurred a
voter revolt.
1. Proposition 8
In June of 1982, the California voters passed Proposition 8, the
self-proclaimed "Victims' Bill of Rights." While this initiative ef-
fected several changes to the California Constitution and statutory
scheme, 2°3 the focus here is on section 28(d), added to the constitu-
tion's Declaration of Rights. In particular, the "Right to Truth-in-Evi-
dence' '204 section provides that "relevant evidence shall not be
excluded in any criminal proceeding."2 °0
exclude the admission of any evidence which was obtained pursuant to the violation of the
right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures."
202. See supra notes 132-55 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 13.
204. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
205. Id. The full section states:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the mem-
bership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded
in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and
hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether
heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing
statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sec-
tions 352,782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or
constitutional right of the press.
CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28(d). For discussions on the practical impact of section 28(d) on
California evidence law, see Hank M. Goldberg, The Impact of Proposition 8 on Prior
Misconduct Impeachment Evidence in California Criminal Cases, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 621
(1991); Mark Dyer Klein & Randall A. Cohen, Comment, Proposition 8: California Law
After In re Lance W. and People v. Castro, 12 PmP. L. RFv. 1059 (1985).
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After the measure survived constitutional challenges,2 and was
held to apply only to crimes committed on or after its effective date,207
the California Supreme Court was forced to reexamine its use of in-
dependent state grounds with respect to the exclusionary rule. In the
following two cases, the state's highest court interpreted the section
overbroadly in order to achieve the result the voters presumably
wanted. While it is important to ascertain the intent of a drafting
body such as the legislature, courts should recognize the differences
between law that comes irom the legislature and that which comes
from the voters. As discussed, the processes of enacting law by voter
initiative and that of legislative law-making are very different. °0 Em-
phasizing the intent of the voters is particularly troubling. Where an
initiative alters fundamental rights, courts should be especially wary of
relying on ambiguous voter intent to justify unnecessarily broad inter-
pretations of the initiative.
In In re Lance W.,2 09 the court addressed whether the vicarious
exclusionary rule established in People v. Martin210 survived section
28(d). In a four to three decision, the court held it did not. In Lance
W., the court determined that the intent of the voters was to "elimi-
nate a judicially created remedy for violations of search and seizure
provisions of the federal or state Constitutions,... except to the ex-
tent that exclusion remains federally compelled. '211
The majority held that the voters had expressed their intent that
the "exclusion of evidence is not an acceptable means of implement-
ing [the right to be free from unreasonable seizures and searches], ex-
cept as required by the Constitution of the United States, '212 and that
section 28(d) "abrogated both the vicarious exclusionary rule ... and
a defendant's right to object to and suppress evidence seized in viola-
tion of the California, but not the Federal, Constitution. 21 3
Conspicuously absent in section 28(d) is any mention of the doc-
trine of independent state grounds, or of the Federal Constitution.
The official legislative analyst merely states that "[tihis measure gen-
erally would allow most relevant evidence to be presented in criminal
cases .... The measure could not affect federal restrictions on the use
206. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982).
207. People v. Smith, 667 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Cal. 1983).
208. See supra notes 192-200 and accompanying text.
209. 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985).
210. 290 P.2d 855 (Cal. 1955).
211. Lance W., 694 P.2d at 752.
212. Id.
213. IML at 747.
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of evidence." '14 The court held that section 28(d) had not implicitly
repealed two clauses of the Declaration of Rights, one which states
that "[rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on
those guaranteed by the United States Constitution,' 215 and another
protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures.2 16 Instead, the
court concluded that the rights stated in sections 13 and 24 still ex-
isted, but Proposition 8 eliminated the remedy of excluding illegally
obtained evidence.217 This contradicts the conclusion in People v.
Cahan 18 that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is the only
effective remedy.219
The other significant "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" decision is
People v. May.220 In May, the issue was whether the rule in People v.
Disbrow,22 1 barring the admission of statements for impeachment pur-
poses that were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona 22 sur-
vived Proposition 8. The court concluded that, indeed, Disbrow had
been abrogated.3 The decision turned on the interpretation of the
savings clause of section 28(d). Section 28(d) states in pertinent part,
"[n]othing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evi-
dence relating to privilege or hearsay .... "I
In his dissent, Justice Mosk argued the rule in Disbrow consti-
tuted an "existing statutory rule relating to evidence." 22 Justice Mosk
based this on the California Evidence Code, which defines a privilege
pursuant to the California and Federal Constitutions.226 Justice Mosk
contended that in Disbrow, the court did not simply provide a remedy
for illegally obtained statements. Rather, the court in Disbrow de-
clared that "the privilege against self-incrimination... precludes use
by the prosecution of any extrajudicial statement by the defendant...
either as affirmative evidence or for the purposes of impeachment, ob-
tained during custodial interrogation in violation of the standards de-
clared in Miranda and its California progeny."'227 This statement by
214. SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 16, at 32.
215. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 24.
216. CAL. CONs?., art. I, § 13.
217. Lance W., 694 P.2d at 756.
218. 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).
219. Id. at 913.
220. 748 P.2d 307 (Cal. 1988).
221. 545 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1976).
222. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
223. May, 748 P.2d at 312-13.
224. CAL. CONS?. art. I, § 28(d).
225. May, 748 P.2d at 314-18 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 314 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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the Disbrow court interprets the California Constitution as protecting
Californians from the use of illegally obtained statements. That is,
when the state uses such statements in a trial against the defendant,
the defendant's right against self-incrimination is violated. Thus, the
rule in Disbrow did not simply provide a remedy for the initial viola-
tion of the privilege when the police illegally obtain a statement.
Rather, Disbrow articulated the extent of the privilege itself.
Nonetheless, relying extensively on the court of appeal's opinion,
a majority of the California Supreme Court determined that the rule
in Disbrow did not purport to "define the scope of the California con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination now set forth in article
I, section 15."1 Rather, the court stated, "[i]n Disbrow,... the court
created a new remedy for violations of Miranda, but did not reinter-
pret or extend the scope of the substantive rights protected by the
Constitution."' 9 Essentially, the court concluded that the Disbrow
rule was not mandated by the California Constitution, and was there-
fore merely a judicially-created remedy. Refusing to read section
28(d) narrowly, the California Supreme Court relied on the presumed
intent of the voters. The court determined that the "probable aim of
the voters in adopting section 28(d)... [was] to dispense with exclu-
sionary rules derived solely from the state Constitution.... ."0 The
court also stated that "it seems very likely that Proposition 8 was
crafted for the very purpose... of abrogating cases such as Disbrow
... ."1 Furthermore, "the voters probably intended to preserve leg-
islatively created evidentiary rules." 2 Despite apparent uncertainty,
the California Supreme Court adhered to the presumed intent of the
voters.
Proposition 8 claimed to have the support of prosecutors and
other law enforcement officials, and it is likely that these groups did
intend to overturn rulings such as Disbrow.23  Nevertheless, the
court's uncertainty regarding voter intent, coupled with the broad and
ambiguous language of section 28(d), should have caused the court to
hesitate in restricting rights such as the privilege against self-
incrimination.
While the court's decisions in May and Lance W. deserve criti-
cism, the political pressures on the California Supreme Court must be
228. Id. at 311.
229. Id.
230. I& at 312 (emphasis added).
231. I& (emphasis added).
232. Id at 313 (emphasis added).
233. SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 16, at 35.
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considered. In 1986, the voters elected to recall three of the court's
justices, including Chief Justice Rose Bird.23 The public was out-
raged by the court's overturning death convictions or sentences on
what appeared to be "technical" grounds. The voters sent a message
to the justices to change their ways, or else. The justices must have
interpreted the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision's silence on
the doctrine of independent state grounds and the vagueness of voter
intent in light of this political climate.
Following Lance W. and May, California courts have used overly
broad interpretations of section 28(d).23- This has resulted in a chip-
ping away of the California Constitution's independence in other ar-
eas of criminal procedure law. In People v. Epps,.3 the appellate
court determined that California courts must follow federal precedent
not only when the suppression of evidence is involved, but also when
dismissing charges against the defendant is the "remedy." In Epps,
the state failed to properly preserve physical evidence which was im-
portant to the defendant's position. The court determined that Propo-
sition 8 applied to this situation-despite the fact that admissibility of
evidence was not an issue. The court reasoned that "where the evi-
dence allegedly lost or destroyed is potentially exculpatory, and the
usual remedy is exclusion of evidence potentially inculpatory, the
functional remedial equivalent of exclusion of evidence is dismissal
.... ."2 Thus, where a defendant's right to "access to evidence"' 38
has been violated and the court would have to dismiss the case under
the California Constitution, pursuant to section 28(d), the court must
not dismiss unless necessary under the Federal Constitution. Section
28(d) says nothing about dismissals, and only addresses the admissibil-
ity of evidence.
234. See Eule, supra note 193, at 1581-82; see also Gerald F. Uelman, Supreme Court
Retention Elections in California, 28 SANTA CLARA L. Rnv. 333 (1988).
235. See People v. Johnson, 767 P.2d 1047, 1065-66 (Cal. 1989) (regarding exclusion of
evidence tests when demonstrative evidence is lost or destroyed); see also People v. Valen-
cia, 218 Cal. App. 3d 808, 816-19 (1990); People v. Lopez, 198 Cal. App. 3d 135, 142-44
(1988) (regarding defendant's right to compulsory process to secure the testimony of de-
fense witnesses). In all of these cases, the courts concluded that Section 28(d) required the
state courts to adhere to federal precedent.
236. 182 Cal. App. 3d 1102 (1986).
237. Id. at 1115.
238. California v. Tkombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984).
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2 Proposition 115
In an attempt to require the California courts to further adhere to
federal precedent with respect to nearly all constitutional issues, the
voters passed Proposition 115 on June 5, 1990.
Similar to the court's broad interpretation of Proposition 8, the
California Supreme Court has also given great deference to the
voter's presumed intent in approving Proposition 115. Although the
court held one section of Proposition 115 constituted an invalid revi-
sion of the constitution, 9 the court has broadly interpreted other
constitutional changes made by Proposition 115. For example, section
30(c) establishes reciprocal discovery in criminal cases, stating: "[iln
order to provide for fair and speedy trials, discovery in criminal cases
shall be reciprocal in nature ...
Prior California case law had established that "[t]he People must
'shoulder the entire load' of their burden of proof in their case in
chief, without assistance either from the defendant's silence or from
his compelled testimony."241 Federal precedents interpreting the fed-
eral privilege against self-incrimination rest on the rationale that the
privilege "'is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person,
not to the information that may incriminate him.'"" In contrast, the
California Supreme Court has relied on the policy of requiring the
prosecution to "'investigate its own case, find its own witnesses, prove
its own facts, and convince the jury through its own resources."" 3
Although initially the California Supreme Court had looked to federal
precedent 2" in interpreting the guarantee,2 5 the court later stated
239. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990); see infra text accompanying
notes 258-76, 296.
240. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 30(c).
241. In re Misener, 698 P.2d 637, 640 (Cal. 1985) (quoting Prudhomme v. Superior
Court, 466 P.2d 673, 676 (Cal. 1970)).
242. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225,233 (1975) (quoting Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973)) (holding that statements made by persons other than the defend-
ant are outside the scope of the self-incrimination clause).
243. Misener, 698 P.2d at 646 (quoting Wldliams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 112 (1970)
(Black, J., concurring and dissenting)).
244. In Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 466 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1970), the court examined the
federal trend of broadening the rights against self-incrimination. The Prudhomme court
noted Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), in which the Supreme Court held that the
Federal Constitution forbid the trial court and the prosecution from commenting on the
defendant's failure to testify, or upon a defendant's reliance on the privilege against self-
incrimination. Another case discussed as part of this trend was Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), which broadened the accusatory stage to which the privilege applies. Also
mentioned was Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), which applied the federal guarantee
against self-incrimination to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court in Prudhomme noted that the United States Supreme Court had
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that "Prudhomme [v. Superior Court] put this court on record as being
considerably more solicitous of the privilege against self-incrimination
than federal law currently requires."246 In Allen v. Superior Court,47
the court had acknowledged that the federal standard was inconsistent
with the California court's interpretation of the privilege. The court
"affirm[ed] the continued vitality of the stringent standards set forth
in Prudhomme for the protection of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation as embodied in article I, section 15. ''248
In Izazaga v. Superior Court,249 however, the supreme court con-
fronted the question of whether prior case law regarding both recipro-
cal discovery and California's protection against self-incrimination
survived section 30(c). The court noted that "the California Constitu-
tion continues to afford criminal defendants an independent source of
protection from infringement of certain rights, including the privilege
against self-incrimination,"' 0 but went on to hold that section 30(c)
"constitutes a specific exception to the broad privilege against self-
incrimination set forth in article I, section 15."' 1 Section 30(c) says
nothing about the privilege against self-incrimination, however, nor
do the statutory changes relating to reciprocal discovery enacted by
Proposition 115P2 2 As to section 30(c) specifically, the legislative ana-
lyst stated that "[t]his measure ... [c]hanges the rule under which
prosecutors and defense attorneys must reveal information to each
other in their prospective criminal cases [and] [r]epeals the require-
ment that a copy of the arrest report be delivered to the defendant at
the initial court appearance, or within two days of the appearance." 3
This does not explain how the proposition changes criminal discovery
rules. Furthermore, this analysis could be interpreted as explaining
that the only rule changed is the rule regarding delivery of the arrest
report to the defendant. Thus, despite the fact that section 30(c) is
silent as to its effect on the privilege against self-incrimination, the
recently granted certiorari in Williams v. Florida, 224 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1969) (holding that
Florida's alibi statute did not violate the Fifth Amendment). The Court in Williams ulti-
mately held that the statute did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78 (1970).
245. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
246. Reynolds v. Superior Court, 528 P.2d 45, 50 (Cal. 1974).
247. 557 P.2d 65 (Cal. 1976).
248. 1& at 67.
249. 815 P.2d 304 (Cal. 1991).
250. 1l at 314.
251. Id.
252. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054-1054.7 (West Supp. 1993).
253. SEcRETARY oF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPi.Er. PRiMARY ELECtION 33
(1990).
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court adopted a rule of construction which allows implicit, albeit par-
tial, repeal of California's privilege against self-incrimination. A ma-
jority of the court determined that section 30(c) was a specific
exception to the privilege against self-incrimination, allowing recipro-
cal discovery to the extent federal precedent allows it. 4
The court's interpretation of section 30(c), however, made the at-
tempted change to section 24 redundant.' 5 Justice Mosk dissented
from the court's broad interpretation of section 30(c) despite the fail-
ure of the proposed amendment to section 24. He argued that section
30(c) could not restrict a defendant's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion as interpreted in Prudhomme unless the voters had effectively
forced California courts to follow federal interpretations of the federal
right against self-incrimination which he concluded they had not
done.256 The court once again deferred to the presumed will of the
voters, and interpreted the proposition to link California self-incrimi-
nation law to federal precedent.257
B. Amendment or Revision?
The California Supreme Court has not only broadly interpreted
specific provisions of initiatives in an attempt to further the presumed
will of the voters, but has also loosely applied the two principal restric-
tions on the use of the initiative, the "no revision rule" and the "sin-
gle-subject rule."" 8  As a result, initiatives can easily overcome
substantive restrictions and can be broadly interpreted even if they
restrict or conflict with pre-existing rights.
According to the California Constitution, while the voters may
amend the constitution, they may not revise it.259 The distinction be-
254. Izazaga, 815 P.2d at 313-14.
255. See id at 333 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
256. Id at 332 for a discussion of the proposed change to Art. I, § 24, see infra text
accompanying notes 258-74, 296.
257. See id at 314, 314 n.9.
258. The single-subject rule is that "fa]n initiative measure embracing more than one
subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect." CAI. CONST. art. II,
§ 8(d). For a more detailed discussion of the single-subject rule, see Daniel H. Lowenstein,
California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REv. 936 (1983) (arguing
for the continued use of the "reasonably germane" standard). But see Steven W. Ray,
Comment, The California Initiative Process: The Demise of the Single-Subject Rule, 14
PAC. LJ. 1095 (1983) (arguing for a stricter interpretation of the single-subject rule).
259. "The electors may amend the Constitution by initiative." CAL. CONST. art. XVIII,
§ 3 (emphasis added). "[A] revision of the constitution may be accomplished only by con-
vening a constitutional convention and obtaining popular ratification, or by legislative sub-
mission of the measure to the voters." Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1085 (Cal.
1990) (interpreting CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-2).
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tween an amendment and a revision is quite gray, and the constitution
does not define these terms. A court faces the dilemma of either ap-
plying the "no revision rule" strictly and facing accusations of frustrat-
ing voter will, or applying the restriction loosely but having to
reconcile an initiative with conflicting provisions in California's Decla-
ration of Rights.260 This quandary underscores the need for a super-
majority vote in order to enact any initiative altering the Declaration
of Rights. Where seventy-five percent of the voters approve of a
change to the Declaration of Rights, the issue of revision or amend-
ment may no longer be relevant.
To its credit, the California Supreme Court, in Raven v.
Deukmejian, invalidated a section of Proposition 115 which would
have abolished the doctrine of independent state grounds with respect
to at least thirty-two constitutional rights.261 One section of Proposi-
tion 115 added the following language to the California provision:
"[r]ights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those
guaranteed by the United States Constitution."262 The provision
continued:
In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of
the laws, to due process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to
be personally present with counsel, to a speedy and public trial,
to compel the attendance of witnesses, to confront the witnesses
against him or her, to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, to privacy, to not be placed twice in jeopardy for the
same offense, and to not suffer the imposition of cruel or unu-
sual punishment, shall be construed by the courts of this state in a
manner consistent with the Constitution of the United States. This
Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford
greater rights to minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal
causes than those afforded by the Constitution of the United
States. 263
Despite the fact that this proposition passed in the special election,
the California Supreme Court held that it would not be enforced be-
cause it constituted a revision of the constitution,264 which may only
be accomplished by a constitutional convention265 or by legislative
submission of the measure to the voters.266 The California Supreme
260. See infra notes 261-74, 296 and accompanying text.
261. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1089.
262. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
263. Id. (emphasis added).
264. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1089.
265. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
266. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
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Court looked to rules established in prior case law to determine
whether this section constituted a revision or an amendment.
In McFadden v. Jordan,7 7 the court invalidated as a revision a
purported constitutional amendment. The measure in McFadden was
called the "California Bill of Rights," and contained 12 separate sec-
tions, 208 subsections and more than 21,000 words. 8 Furthermore,
the measure included sections covering subjects such as a pension
commission, wagering and gaming, oleomargarine, healing arts, civic
centers, and surface mining.269 The court held that the title of the
initiative created "a misleading and confusing conflict in terminology
of titles and related subject matter.. ." with California's Declaration
of Rights.270 The court found that "at least 15 of the 25 articles con-
tained in our present Constitution would be repealed either in their
entirety or substantially altered by the measure, a minimum of four
... new topics would be treated, and the functions of both the legisla-
tive and the judicial branches of our state government would be sub-
stantially curtailed." 271 In holding that the initiative constituted an
invalid revision of the constitution, the court determined that, given
the multifarious and far-reaching provisions in that particular initia-
tive, it was unnecessary to "undertake to define with nicety the line of
demarcation" between an amendment and a revision.272 Instead, the
court stated that "[e]ach situation ... must; we think, be resolved
upon its own facts."273
In Raven, the section in dispute only changed the independent
nature of the California Constitution as to specific rights. This sec-
tion, however, necessarily affected other provisions in the Declaration
of Rights by proclaiming each of the rights enumerated in the new
section 24. The Raven court correctly pointed out that the new section
24 implicated "fundamental constitutional rights ...including the
rights to due process of law, equal protection of the law, assistance of
counsel, and avoidance of cruel and unusual punishment."2 74 The
court further stated:
[a]s to these rights, as well as other important rights listed in
new section 24, California courts in criminal cases would no
267. 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948).
268. Id. at 790.
269. Id. at 791-93.
270. Id. at 794.
271. Id. at 796.
272. Id at 798.
273. Id.
274. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1087 (emphasis added).
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longer have authority to interpret the state Constitution in a
manner more protective of defendants' rights than extended by
the Federal Constitution, as construed by the United States
Supreme Court.... Thus, [the new section 24] not only unduly
restricts judicial power, but it does so in a way which severely
limits the independent force and effect of the California
Constitution.275
Despite this strong support for the doctrine of independent state
grounds,27 6 the California Supreme Court has not found that other
voter-initiated changes to the declaration of rights have amounted to
revisions even though such changes force the California courts to ad-
here to federal precedent.
The "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision of Proposition 8 pur-
ported to attack only one instance of the California Supreme Court's
application of the doctrine of independent state grounds. The court
held that section 28(d) only eliminated the court-created exclusion of
evidence remedy for violating an accused's rights.2 77 In Brosnahan v.
Brown,278 the court however, addressed the issue of revision or
amendment in general terms and with respect to the proposition as a
whole. When section 28(d) was later challenged as an impermissible
revision in In re Lance W., the court relied on its previous, but cur-
sory, conclusion in Brosnahan 9 Meanwhile, the "Right to Truth-in-
Evidence" section of Proposition 8 greatly impeded the court's ability
to protect the broader rights which the court claimed were not af-
fected by the provision. By restricting courts' use of the exclusionary
hle, section 28(d) limited the courts' ability to protect Californians'
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, right against
self-incrimination, and right to access to evidence.
As to Proposition 115, the court in Raven held that constitutional
amendments requiring reciprocal discovery.1 0 allowing joinder of
cases,2 1 admitting hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings,'
275. Id. at 1087-88.
276. One commentator has asserted that in Raven the court stiffened the distinction
between a constitutional amendment and a revision. Joseph Goldberg, Note, Raven v.
Deukmejian: A Modem Guide to the Voter Initiative Process and State Constitutional Inde-
pendence, 28 SAN DiEGo L. Rnv. 729, 738-39 (1991).
277. In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 752 (Cal. 1985).
278. 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982).
279. Lance W., 694 P.2d at 770.
280. "In order to provide for fair and speedy trials, discovery in criminal cases shall be
reciprocal in nature, as prescribed by the Legislature or by the people through the initia-
tive process." CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 30(c).
281. "This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to prohibit the joining of
criminal cases as prescribed by the Legislature or by the people through the initiative pro-
cess." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30(a).
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prohibiting post-indictment hearings, 3 and proclaiming the People's
right to due process and a speedy and public trial,8 do not constitute
invalid revisions either "standing alone or in the aggregate."' Nev-
ertheless, in addition to affecting the ability of California courts to
independently interpret and protect the rights affected by the above
provisions, these provisions also limit the affected rights themselves.
Attempting to distinguish the above changes made by Proposition 115
from the holding in Lance W., and a similar challenge in People v.
Frierson, 8 6 the court stated that "the isolated provisions at issue [in
those cases] achieved no far reaching, fundamental changes in our
governmental plan."2 7 The court said that none of the above exam-
ples "involved a broad attack on state court authority to exercise in-
dependent judgment in construing a wide spectrum of important
rights under the state Constitution."
This is not a principled application of the prohibition against con-
stitutional revision through the initiative process. The implications of
the court's holdings in Raven, Brosnahan, and Frierson are that the
voters may slowly chip away at the rights declared in Article I, as they
did with the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision of Proposition 8,
and sections of Proposition 115. The court will characterize such in-
cremental changes as valid amendments. However, if the voters at-
tempt to accomplish these smaller steps in one fell swoop, they will be
attempting an invalid revision of the constitution.
The court must more fully explore the "qualitative" nature of
constitutional changes which appear to be less sweeping than the
changes proposed by section 5 of Proposition 115 and by the "Califor-
nia Bill of Rights" initiative challenged in McFadden. While the court
in McFadden relied heavily on the mere "quantitative" nature of the
changes proposed by the initiative in question, the court also closely
examined some of the "qualitative" changes. The court looked to the
282. "In order to protect victims and witnesses in criminal cases, hearsay evidence shall
be admissible at preliminary hearings, as prescribed by the Legislature or by the people
through the initiative process." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30(b).
283. "If a felony is prosecuted by indictment, there shall be no postindictment prelimi-
nary hearing." CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 14.1.
284. "In a criminal case, the people of the State of California have the right to due
process of law and to a speedy and public trial." CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 29.
285. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1086.
286. 599 P.2d 587, 613-14 (Cal. 1979) (upholding a provision which essentially required
the California courts in capital cases to interpret the state guarantee against cruel or unu-
sual punishment in a manner consistent with federal precedent).
287. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1089.
288. 1&
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fact that the proposition was entitled "California Bill of Rights." The
court found this presented an apparent conflict with the title and sub-
ject matters in Article I of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Rights."" 9  Proposition 8 was entitled "The Victims' Bill of
Rights," 29 which arguably creates confusion with California's Decla-
ration of Rights. Furthermore, although the court in Lance W., deter-
mined that the Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision only eliminated
a judicially created remedy, this section has been more broadly inter-
preted to extend not only to evidence seized in violation of article I,
section 13, but also to statements obtained in violation of an accused's
right against self-incrimination. 291 Additionally, the California appel-
late courts have extended section 28(d)'s exclusion of evidence to the
remedy of dismissal. 2"
While the court determined that the reciprocal discovery provi-
sion in Proposition 115 "constitutes a specific exception to the broad
privilege against self-incrimination," 293 statutory amendments enacted
by the initiative state that "no discovery shall occur in criminal cases
except as provided by this chapter,... or as mandated by the Constitu-
tion of the United States."2 94 Thus, Proposition 115 not only created
an "exception" to California's protection against self-incrimination,
but also declared that the Federal Constitution, rather than the state
constitution, would provide for any limitations on reciprocal discov-
ery. The effect of this is to take interpretation of the privilege against
self-incrimination outside the realm of the California courts and to
leave such interpretation to the federal courts, at least as to limits on
prosecutorial discovery. The California courts are again deprived of
their power to independently interpret the state constitution.
The California Supreme Court should impose a more exacting
qualitative standard to determine whether an initiative has revised,
rather than amended, provisions in the Declaration of Rights. There
is nothing in the court's reasoning in Raven to preveit the voters in
future initiatives from enacting piecemeal changes to provisions in the
Declaration of Rights which would have the effect of requiring the
state courts to follow federal interpretation of similar rights. As the
289. McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 794 (Cal. 1948).
290. CALiFOpmA BALLOT PAMHLF, PRIMARY ELECrION 33 (June 8,1982).
291. People v. May, 748 P.2d 307 (Cal. 1988)
292. People v. Epps, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1102 (1986) (holding that where dismissal would
not be required under the federal constitution, based on the state's failure to preserve
evidence, Proposition 8 precludes dismissal).
293. Izazaga v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 304, 314 (Cal. 1991).
294. Id. at 315 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054).
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Raven court stated, "forced linkage"295 would "substantially alter the
substance and integrity of the state Constitution as a document of in-
dependent force and effect. ' '296 Despite this confirmation of the Cali-
fornia Constitution's independent nature, these inconsistent holdings
permit the voters to slowly chip away at the Declaration of Rights'
independence by voting for specific exceptions to various sections
over multiple elections, rather than adopting one measure to accom-
plish that goal. Because of the broad latitude the California Supreme
Court has granted to the voters, it is unlikely the court will begin to
impose a more exacting standard for the "no revision rule." The
strongest proposal would be a compromise between the rights of the
voters to link California's Declaration of Rights to federal interpreta-
tion, and the rights of all Californians to an independent state
constitution.
C. Recent Use of the California Declaration of Rights
The current California Supreme Court, while granting great def-
erence to the will of the voters, has nonetheless acknowledged the
importance of the state constitution. Even where the court has ulti-
mately concluded that federal precedent applied, the court has at least
examined the state constitution. As discussed, the court in Izazaga v.
Superior Court' 7 held that the reciprocal discovery provision enacted
by Proposition 115 constituted an exception to the state privilege
against self-incrimination; but the court also held that "the California
Constitution continues to afford criminal defendants an independent
source of protection from infringement of certain rights .... 299 In
addition, the Raven court used strong language to support the impor-
tance of the independent state grounds doctrine. Nonetheless, the
court's current analysis of when the doctrine should apply is no more
reasoned than in the days of Brisendine and Disbrow.
In Tapia v. Superior Court,2 99 the court held that certain provi-
sions of Proposition 115 could be applied to prosecutions of crimes
committed before the Proposition's effective date."co Robert Allen
Tapia challenged retroactive application of Proposition 115 on state
and federal ex post facto grounds. The California Declaration of
Rights, section 9, provides, "[a] bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or
295. Slobogin, supra note 39, at 664.
296. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1087 (Cal. 1990).
297. 815 P.2d 304 (Cal. 1991); see supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
298. Id., 815 P.2d at 314.
299. 807 P.2d 434 (Cal. 1991).
300. Ia at 446.
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law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed."30 1 The
United States Constitution provides "[n]o state shall... pass any...
ex post facto law.' '3°  The court in Tapia appears to have set out a
framework under which the court will determine whether California's
constitution should be interpreted differently from equivalent federal
provisions. First, the court looked to the textual similarities, and con-
cluded nothing in the language of California's provision supported an
interpretation different from federal interpretation.30 3 Next, the court
examined the history of the state provision, and concluded that Cali-
fornia had only followed the broader "substantial protection" analysis
when forced to do so by the Supremacy Clause.3° While federal pre-
cedent had long adhered to the "substantial protection" analysis, a
little over two weeks after Proposition 115 was approved, the United
States Supreme Court had rejected the "substantial protection" analy-
sis in Collins v. Youngblood. 305 Finding no "independent footing in
the state Constitution,"3° the Tapia court followed the Collins inter-
pretation of the federal ex post facto clause.
The California Supreme Court is now applying the doctrine of
independent state grounds backwards. The court should not look for
a reason to apply the California Constitution, but rather for a reason
to follow federal interpretation, even where California interpretation
employs federal precedent. Again, simply because a state court has
decided to adopt the law of another jurisdiction, this does not forever
bind that state to the future case law of the other jurisdiction. Fur-
thermore, the Tapia court ignored California's "long standing pre-
sumption... that new nondecisional law operates prospectively. ' 307
California courts, in order to preserve the integrity of the state
constitution, should base decisions first on the text of the state consti-
tution, then on state constitutional and common law, and finally on
preexisting state law. After a decision is reached based on these ele-
ments of state law, the state court should examine federal law for any
possible violation. 0 8 The state's Declaration of Rights must receive
301. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9.
302. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The United States Constitution imposes a similar
limitation on the federal government. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
303. Tapia, 807 P.2d at 441.
304. Id. at 442.
305. 497 U.S. 37, 44-47 (1990) (restricting application of the ex post facto clause in the
Federal Constitution).
306. Tapia, 807 P.2d at 442.
307. Id. at 448 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
308. This is a variation of criteria set out by the Washington Supreme Court in State v.
Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812-13 (Wash. 1986).
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some insulation from voter whim in order to give state courts the op-
portunity to independently examine state rights.
VI. Super Majority Proposal
There have been a number of proposals for altering the methods
by which the voters may initiate changes to the constitution, but few
focus on the need to preserve the doctrine of independent state
grounds. This dimension of preserving the independence of the state
constitution adds a layer of complexity to proposals for revamping the
initiative process.
Usually the type of proposal offered depends on what the com-
mentator perceives as "the problem." Commentators concerned with
voter understanding, abuse of the process, and the opportunity for de-
liberation and debate, usually offer proposals which focus on the initi-
ative process. For example, one commentator has urged the adoption
of expedited legislative involvement.30 9
Some states which provide for the initiative only allow "indirect"
use of the initiative. That is, proponents of a proposition must first
present the proposal to the state legislature and give that body an op-
portunity to adopt the proposal, or a proposal which is substantially
similar. If the legislature fails to act, then the proposition usually goes
on the ballot. States which employ the indirect initiative usually re-
quire a minimal percentage of signatures at the petition stage before
the proposal will be presented to the legislature. If the legislature fails
to act, proponents must then obtain additional signatures before sub-
mitting the proposal to the voters.310 This solution presents a number
of problems. First, it is unlikely the people of California would be
willing to give up direct access to the ballot. While the state legisla-
ture is certainly more free from domination by interest groups, a situa-
tion which initially spurred the adoption of direct democracy, voters
will want to maintain the direct check which they now possess. Sec-
ondly, the proposed procedure is too complex and costly for the goals
it attempts to achieve-complex in that it involves, or could involve,
all of the other branches of government before anything is submitted
to the voters. Many proponents of the direct initiative are likely to
argue that the time lag between the first round of signatures and the
second would deprive proponents of propositions of the initial enthu-
siasm for their proposals. This accounts for the additional costs. Al-
309. Nick Brestoff, Comment, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Re-
form, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 922, 953-58 (1975).
310. See id. at 924.
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ready a tremendous amount of resources and time are required just at
the signature gathering stage n  To further stretch out this time
would result in far fewer initiatives surviving. Furthermore, it is likely
that those which do survive will do so only because the proponents
have ample funds to keep the proposal alive, and a class bias may
develop. Finally, this solution does not address the true problem with
the voter initiative. While the process could benefit from some oppor-
tunity for deliberation and debate before the proposed change reaches
the signature stage, the proposal described above would not provide
any additional insulation of the Declaration of Rights from majority
whim. Even if Propositions 8 and 115 had first been submitted to the
legislature, and the legislature had expressed concern that certain sec-
tions of these propositions could deprive the state constitution of its
independence, the proponents of the measures could nonetheless have
placed the measures on the ballot. While the voters may understand
the legislature had these concerns, the high emotions and passions sur-
rounding "victims' rights," would probably have spurred the voters to
adopt the proposals regardless of the opportunity for debate.
One commentator has expressed concern that the California
Constitution is in danger of becoming a mere statute.312 This com-
mentator proposes that initiative law be a separate body of law, sub-
ject to the constitution, but superior to legislatively enacted law. The
proposal would still allow the voters to amend the constitution, but
only by a two-thirds or sixty percent vote, rather than a simple major-
ity.3 13 While this proposal would provide greater protection to Article
I of the California Constitution, it would restrict the voters with re-
spect to the remaining articles. The rest of the constitution is by now
far too detailed to justify this type of limitation. Unless the rest of the
constitution can be "cleaned up," the voters should not be restricted
from amending the other articles.
Other commentators have proposed several methods to check
voter whim and caprice. Each proposal, however, would leave the fi-
nal determination of validity to the federal courts. One commentator
discusses the lack of the types of "checks" in the initiative process
which are inherent in the legislative process, and states that this differ-
ence should compel greater judicial scrutiny of initiatives than of legis-
lative acts.314 But this commentator also acknowledges that most
311. MAGLEBY, supra note 168, at 61-70.
312. Note, California's Constitutional Amendomania, 1 STAN. L. REv. 279 (1949).
313. Id. at 287-88.
314. Eule, supra note 193, at 1558-73.
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states which allow for the initiative also allow for voter recall of
judges.315 The commentator then suggests that the protection of mi-
nority rights be left to the federal courts. As this article has discussed,
when the federal courts began to shirk their duty as "guardians of
minority rights, 316 states began looking to their own constitutions in
order to maintain, and even expand the rights available in the Federal
Constitution. By surrendering their ability to protect these rights to
the federal courts, state constitutions will lose all of their indepen-
dence, and may lead one to question the reason for retaining state
declarations of rights.
Former Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court, Hans Linde,
has argued for enforcement of the "guaranty clause" with respect to
initiatives.317 He acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court
has held that issues regarding the guaranty clause are non-justiciable
political questions. He argues, however, that this should not prevent
state courts from interpreting the clause. This proposal also fails be-
cause even if a state supreme court held an initiative violated the
guaranty clause, the decision could be appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, which would either summarily reverse the decision,
or provide an opinion stating that such issues are non-justiciable.
Once again, the ultimate issue would be left to the federal courts and
state constitutional independence would be undercut.
Proposing substantive restrictions on amending the Declaration
of Rights by initiative, would be an attractive option, but is fraught
with problems. First, such a limitation would put the burden on the
courts to determine when an initiative has violated the rule. As dis-
cussed with respect to other restrictions enforceable by the judiciary,
namely the single-subject and no revision rules, courts are very hesi-
tant to apply these rules strictly to initiatives, and historically have
granted initiatives great deference. This is unavoidable when judges
may be recalled by the voters and are thus directly accountable to
them. Secondly, Propositions 8 and 115 have already taken away
rights previously preserved by other sections of article I, under the
guise of adding new rights-the rights of victims. There is no princi-
pled method for distinguishing between the limitation or elimination
of certain rights and the granting of "new" rights, except perhaps in
extreme cases.
315. Id. at 1579-82.
316. Id. at 1542.
317. Hans A. Linde, When is Initiative Lawmaking Not "Republican Government?", 17
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 159, 160-61 (1989).
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Another possible solution would be to revise the constitution to
restrict the voters' ability to amend the constitution to only articles II
through XXXIV. In other words, insulate all of article I by prohibit-
ing any amendments by initiative. As tempting as this proposal may
be, it too presents significant problems. Voters are extremely protec-
tive of their right to participate directly in the law-making process,
and would likely vehemently resist an attempt to put any initiative
aspect completely beyond their reach. Moreover, such a limitation
would deprive the voters of the opportunity to define and enact "new"
rights. For example, the right to privacy was not expressly provided
for in the state constitution until the voters approved the provision in
1974. While one might disagree with the way voters have expressed
the "rights of victims," rights are evolving, and not static. To place the
Declaration of Rights completely beyond the reach of the voters
would deprive the Californian people of the opportunity to express
new rights.
The Massachusetts Constitution protects rights from alterations
by the electorate. Massachusetts allows only indirect initiatives, and
further forbids any changes affecting freedom of speech, press, elec-
tions, assembly, just compensation, and the right of access to the
courts.318 As a result, since the initiative was adopted in Massachu-
setts, there have been only two constitutional amendments pro-
posed. In Illinois, the only initiatives which the voters may propose
are constitutional amendments affecting the state legislature.3 20 While
these types of limitations would certainly insulate California's Decla-
ration of Rights, it is likely that the voters of California would not
accept putting anything completely beyond their reach.
A super-majority proposal is clearly the most superior. This pro-
posal achieves a balance between the competing interests of the vot-
ers' right to make law, and the right of all Californians to a
constitution which is independent of the Federal Constitution. As
simplistic as it may sound, the voters may continue to propose amend-
ments to the state's Declaration of Rights by obtaining the same per-
centage of signatures as are now required, but an amendment to the
Declaration of Rights will only become law if passed by a super ma-
jority of three-fourths, or seventy-five percent, of voters who vote in
318. MAss. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII.
319. Duois, supra note 189, at 16.
320. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
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the election. 32 ' Currently, an initiative becomes law if passed by a
simple majority of those who vote on that initiative. The percentage
should be based on the number of voters who participate in the partic-
ular election because some voters may refrain from voting on some
measures. Voters may refrain from voting on an initiative which is
farther down the list of initiatives, or simply because they do not un-
derstand the particular initiative.32 Such disinterest and confusion
should be considered when determining whether an initiative becomes
law.
The percentage for passage, rather than the percentage for quali-
fication for the ballot, is important because voters, for a variety of
reasons, will sign petitions without reading or fully understanding
them.32 Some, for instance, may sign as a result of peer pressure;
others may sign simply to get the signature gatherer to move on, and
still others may sign without understanding that they are qualifying
the proposition for the ballot. By concentrating on the numbers
needed for passage, only those amendments to the Declaration of
Rights which are meritorious, and not simply a result of whim or ca-
price, will be enacted. Proposition 8 passed by a majority of 56.4%,32
and Proposition 115 passed by 57.03% of the vote.3 5
Rather than attempt to make it more difficult for the voters to
amend any portion of the Constitution, this proposal is limited to the
Declaration of Rights, which sets forth individual fundamental rights.
This is because of the structural argument that declarations of rights
are different from other parts of a constitution.3 26 Furthermore, ex-
tending this proposal to the entire California Constitution would sim-
ply be impractical. The reality of the situation in California is that
articles II through XxxIV, while laying down some enduring princi-
ples, are replete with details, and require regular fine-tuning and re-
finement. Ideally, California should streamline its constitution and
place many of the constitutional sections within its statutory law; this
is unlikely to occur, however, due the extreme detail already present
321. The California Constitution requires a super-majority vote with respect to local
debts. CA. CONST. art. XVI, § 18 ("No county, city, town, township, board of education,
or school district, shall incur any indebtedness ... exceeding in any year the income and
revenue provided for such year... without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified elec-
tors thereof").
322. MAGLEBY, supra note 168, at 142-44.
323. Id. at 62-64.
324. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE; PRMARY ELECION 45 (June 8,
1982).
325. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEmENT OF afm VOTE 8 (June 5, 1990).
326. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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in the constitution. For this reason, as well as those set out earlier, this
Article's proposal is limited to California's Declaration of Rights.
Finally, this proposal does not simply argue the broader view that
more rights are always better and that voters should not be able to
override California Supreme Court opinions which provide for
broader protection of rights than guaranteed under the federal consti-
tution. While all Californians might well benefit from broader rights,
this Article's main concern is with the limitations on the California
judiciary's ability to independently examine the state constitution.
Propositions 8 and 115 have been interpreted to link state interpreta-
tion to federal precedent, which effectively deprives the state constitu-
tion of its independence and the California judiciary'of its ability to
consider unique circumstances.
Furthermore, such linkage will force California courts to defer
"all judicial interpretive power" to the federal courts.3 27 If a particu-
lar California Supreme Court ruling makes voters unhappy, the voters
may alter those rulings.
Some might criticize this proposal as result-oriented. Not only
does it seek to preserve individual and sometimes unpopular rights, it
also seeks to preserve the integrity of California's Declaration of
Rights. More important than insulating individual rights from voter
caprice, is the goal of maintaining the.independence of California's
courts to interpret the state constitution, and not be forced to look
only to federal interpretation of similar rights.
This analysis and proposal should not be read as mere disagree-
ment with expressing rights for crime victims. There is merit to such
rights, but the creation and protection of victims' rights should not
result in a chipping away of rights possessed by all Californians, and
should not strip California's Declaration of Rights of its independence
from the United States Constitution.
327. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1086 (Cal. 1990).
[Vol. 21:95
